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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly granted Defendant
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy's (the "District") Motion for
Summary Judgment. Specifically, the issues are:
Issue No. 1: Whether the district court correctly determined that the statutory form
warranty deeds in which the grantors conveyed and warranted property to the District's
predecessors transferred fee simple title with personal covenants rather than creating an
easement, where the phrase "for canal purposes only" was added to the end of the deeds.
Issue No. 2: Whether the district court correctly ruled that fee simple title rather
than an easement was conveyed by a stipulated judgment in condemnation that decreed
that the District's predecessors "take, acquire and have for its use in fee" the subject
property.
Issue No. 3: Whether the district court correctly held that installation of
underground water pipes is within the scope of a canal easement.
Issue No. 4: Whether the district court was correct in holding that the District's
predecessors did not abandon their rights to the Canal when they used the Canal for storm
water drainage rather than irrigation where the Canal is dedicated to a public use, two
notices of interest in the Canal were recorded, and rights to the Canal were subsequently
transferred.
1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The above issues were decided on summary judgment. Summary judgment is
proper when 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether
the lower court correctly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, the Court
must view the factual submissions to the trial court and inferences to be drawn therefrom
"in the light most favorable to the losing party." Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210,
1212 (Utah App. 1998). Moreover, the trial court's grant of summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness with no deference given to the lower court's conclusions of law.
Nyman, 966 P.2d at 1212 (quoting Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah
1997)).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES BELOW
Each of the issues was presented and addressed in the District's Motion for
Summary Judgment and supporting memoranda (890-92, 893-997); Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition to the District's Motion for Summary Judgment (10911358); Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and supporting memoranda
(1493-96, 1455-92); the District's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (1735-41); the November 8, 2007 hearing (1846); the
February 20, 2008 Memorandum Decision (1858-70); and the September 30,2008 Order
Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment (1982-87).
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES. AND REGULATIONS
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or
regulations.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course Proceedings, and Disposition Below
The District is a metropolitan water district that provides municipal water to Salt
Lake City and Sandy City. In an effort to meet the water needs of ever expanding
development, the District has been constructing millions of dollars in new water
treatment and conveyance facilities. As part of this program, the District constructed a
pipeline (the "Aqueduct") to connect water treatment plants and provide an essential link
between water systems on the east and west sides of the Salt Lake Valley. Draper City
requested that the District build the Aqueduct through the Draper Canal (the "Canal")? a
long established canal and utility corridor, rather than through the city streets. Draper
City granted the District a "Non-Exclusive Pipeline Right of Way and Easement
Agreement" ("District Easement") allowing the use of the Canal for the Aqueduct. The
Canal adjoins or crosses the Appellants' (hereafter the "Landowners") properties. (R.
398, 406-412.)
The Landowners brought this action in 2005 (R. 1-248), seeking to enjoin the
construction of the Aqueduct on the grounds that it is beyond the scope of the District's
rights in the Canal and that the District's predecessors abandoned their rights in the
Canal The District filed a counterclaim to quiet title in the Canal. (R. 763-83.) After a
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full evidentiary hearing on the Landowners' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the
district court determined that the Landowners had failed to demonstrate that the Aqueduct
would exceed the scope of the District's easement rights. (R. 762.) The court denied the
Landowners' motion and allowed construction to proceed. (R. 762.)
The District completed the Aqueduct and moved for summary judgment on its
quiet title claim and the Landowners' claims against the District. (R. 890-92, 893-997.)
After considering the undisputed facts and construing all disputed facts in the light most
favorable to the Landowners, the district court granted the District's motion for summary
judgment, finding that (1) the warranty deeds and stipulated judgment in condemnation
conveyed fee simple title; (2) the installation of underground water pipes is within the
scope of a canal easement; and (3) the Landowners' abandonment claim, which the
Landowners had previously conceded they did not have facts to prevail, failed because
the Landowners had not set forth sufficient facts to establish clear and convincing
evidence that the District's predecessors intended to abandon their interests in the Canal.
(R. 1865-68.) Accordingly, the court granted the District's Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R. 1982-87.) After resolving other issues in the case, the district court
granted final judgment on September 30, 2008. (R. 1982-87.) This appeal followed.
Statement of Undisputed Facts
The following undisputed facts were established by the District's affidavits and by
the testimony received in the hearing on the Landowners' motion for preliminary
injunction:
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The District
The District is a metropolitan water district, organized under Utah Code § 17A-2801, et seq. and provides municipal water to Salt Lake City and Sandy City, who in turn
provide water to residences and businesses both within their boundaries and to significant
portions of the Salt Lake Valley outside their boundaries. (R. 395-96.) The District also
provides significant quantities of surplus water to the Jordan Valley Water Conservancy
District ("Jordan Valley"), the other large public water provider in Salt Lake County. (R.
395-96.) Since 2005, the District has been constructing $250 million in new facilities to
address critical public needs for additional water treatment and conveyance, system
redundancy and reliability, and more efficient use of water supplies. (R. 396.)
The Aqueduct
As part of this program, the District constructed the $60 million Point of the
Mountain Aqueduct (the "Aqueduct")—a 60-inch diameter buried pipe connecting the
District's new Point of the Mountain Water Treatment Plant with its existing Little
Cottonwood Water Treatment Plant and Jordan Valley's facilities. (R. 885, 901, 396-97.)
The Aqueduct provides an essential link between east and west side water systems, and
fulfills a number of important water supply and management functions, better utilizing
high spring flows, providing system redundancy in the event of a failure or shutdown of
some portion of the system, and conserving other critical sources of water. (R. 397.)
The District constructed the underground Aqueduct through the historic Draper
Canal, a long established open canal and utility corridor that adjoins or crosses the
Landowners' properties. (R. 398, 500-01.) Thus, the historically open canal has been
5

filled and the land has been restored to its original grade. (R. 399.) The conversion of
the open canal to an underground aqueduct provides benefits to the surrounding
landowners including (1) elimination of drowning hazards; (2) elimination of foul odors
associated with Jordan River canal water; (3) elimination of mosquito breeding areas; and
(4) easier crossings of the canal corridor. (R. 399.) In their affidavits opposing the
District's motion for summary judgment, the Landowners did not dispute these benefits,
nor did they offer any evidence that the Aqueduct imposed greater burdens on their
properties than the open canal. (R. 1191-1212, 1214-18, 1220-33.)
The Canal
The Canal property was acquired and the Canal was built by the Utah Lake
Irrigation Company ("ULIC") in approximately 1914-15. (R. 339.) In 1921, ULIC
conveyed the Canal to the Draper Irrigation Company ("Draper Irrigation"). (R. 510,
541-42, 339.) The Canal consists of a strip of land three rods (49.5 feet) wide (R. 339),
and is divided into "reaches"—individual stretches that correspond to the boundaries of
the original parcels of land acquired by ULIC (R. 500). Reaches 16 through 19 are at
issues here. (R. 1859.)
Ever since ULIC obtained ownership of the Canal in 1921, the Canal has been
dedicated to the public use of delivering irrigation water from the Jordan River to land in
south-eastern Salt Lake County. (R. 339.) For many years irrigation water flowed by
gravity through an open ditch running through the Canal property. (R. 339.)
As land in southeast Salt Lake County developed and became more urbanized, the
Canal began to receive significant flows of urban and storm water runoff. (R. 339.)
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As a result of this increased runoff, Draper Irrigation entered into a series of
agreements with Salt Lake County beginning in December 1975, which allowed the
County to use the Canal as part of its storm drain and flood control system, and the Canal
was thus dedicated to that additional public use. (R. 339, 346-362.)
In 1993-94, Draper Irrigation installed underground irrigation water pipelines
across most of the Canal property, but these pipelines were not installed across Reaches
16 through 19. (R. 339.) In 1995 Draper Irrigation ceased flowing irrigation water
through what remained of the open ditch. (R. 339.) However, both before and after
irrigation water ceased flowing through Reaches 16 through 19, Draper Irrigation always
maintained its interests in those Reaches for water conveyance facilities. (R. 339.)
For example, Draper Irrigation restated its claim of interest in the Canal in the
public record on two separate occasions. The first was by notarized letter dated April 15,
1983, expressing concerns that the title companies were not performing sufficient
research to recover the older 1921 conveyance documents and that the assessors' maps
were insufficient in their annotation of the Canal ownership. (R. 511, 544-47.) This
letter noted failings in the recordation of the 1921 conveyance with respect to certain
areas that include Reaches 16 through 19. (R. 511, 544-47.) A second Notice of Interest
dated November 1998 expressed notice of continued ownership of the Canal property.
(R. 340, 364-77.)
The Affidavit of Draper Irrigation's manager established that at no time did
Draper Irrigation intend to abandon any of its interests in Reaches 16 through 19 of the
Canal, and that it always intended to maintain the Canal as a water conveyance facility,
7

whether for irrigation, culinary water, storm water, or other utility purposes. (R. 340.)
The only evidence of abandonment offered by the Landowners consisted of Landowner
statements that Draper Irrigation had ceased flowing irrigation water through the Canal
and had failed to perform maintenance on the Canal. (R. 1191-1212, 1214-18, 1220-33.)
Eventually, Draper City acquired both Draper Irrigation's and Salt Lake County's
interest in the Canal. In the late 1990s, Salt Lake County transferred control over the
storm drain and flood control uses of the south portion of the Canal (including Reaches
16 through 19) to Draper City, and the agreement between Draper Irrigation and the
County terminated as to that portion of the Canal in 1999. (R. 340, 379-81.) Then, in
2001, Draper Irrigation conveyed its entire interest in the Canal to Draper City, reserving
an easement for its irrigation pipelines. (R. 340, 383-94.) The 2001 Agreement between
Draper Irrigation and Draper City states that Draper acquired the Canal "for use as a
public trail and for storm drainage purposes." (R. 340, 383-94.)
The District's Easement
When the District was in the process of selecting a location for the Aqueduct,
Draper City requested that the District build the Aqueduct in the Canal, rather than in city
streets. (R. 398.) Draper City granted the District a "Non-Exclusive Pipeline Right of
Way and Easement Agreement" ("District Easement") allowing the use of the Canal for
the Aqueduct. (R. 398, 406-412.) As consideration for the District Easement, the
District paid Draper City $500,000.00 and agreed to construct Draper City's storm drain
facilities and a public trail in the Canal. (R. 398, 406-412.) The District Easement was
recorded on August 11, 2004. (R. 412.)
8

Conflicting Title Claims to the Canal
The Landowners are private property owners in Draper, Utah, whose lands abut
Reaches 16 through 19 of the Canal. (R. 500-01.) Each Landowner claims certain
property rights in the Canal. (R. 23, 26-35.) The details of the title claims for each
Reach are as follows:
Reach 16:

ULIC acquired title to Reach 16fromBayard and Matilda Crosgrove

through a "Warranty Deed," recorded on April 10, 1914 (the "Crosgrove Warranty
Deed 1"). (R. 500, 525.) The granting clause of the Crosgrove Warranty Deed 1
expressly "conveys and warrants" to ULIC the .51 acre tract of land now referred to as
Reach 16 of the Canal. (R. 500, 525.) Following the granting clause and the description
of the property, the Crosgrove Warranty Deed 1 states that "the grantee agrees to
construct and maintain one concrete bridge and two 1 foot galvanized iron flumes, across
its canal for the use of the grantor." (R. 500, 525.) The deed further states that "[s]aid
strip of land to be used for canal purposes only/' and allows the Grantors to construct a
fence across the canal at their land's boundaries (R. 500, 525.)
Appellants Costanzas currently own the property on the west side of Reach 16. (R.
26-7, 202-03, 500, 588-90.) The Costanzas' title originated with a deed from Bayard and
Matilda Crosgrove, recorded in 1944. (R. 500, 521-23, 578.) A 1951 warranty deed
transferring the property now owned by the Costanzas contains the following exception
in the property description: "[e]xcepting therefrom that portion thereof, conveyed to Utah
Lake Irrigation Company, a corporation by Deed [] recorded April 10, 1914." (R. 500,
582.) The current deed to the Costanzas describes the property thus: "[beginning at a
9

point on the West right of way line of the Draper Irrigation Company Canal... thence
East 455.55 feet, more or less, to the West right of way of the Draper Irrigation Company
Canal; thence [] along said right of way

" (R. 202-03, 504, 588-90.) Thus, the

Costanza title is expressly limited to correspond with and lie west of the Canal.
Additionally, the current tax assessor's map shows the Canal and the Costanza property
as separate parcels, and the assessor's records indicate that Costanza is not assessed
property tax for any portion of the Canal. (R. 504, 671, 680-81.)
Reach 17:

ULIC acquired title to Reach 17 pursuant to an instrument entitled

"Warranty Deed," recorded April 10, 1914, from Charles and Elizabeth Crosgrove (the
"Crosgrove Warranty Deed 2"). (R. 500, 528-30.) The granting clause of the
Crosgrove Warranty Deed 2 expressly "conveys and warrants" to ULIC the .48 acre tract
of land now referred to as Reach 17 of the Canal. (R. 500, 528-30.) The Crosgrove
Warranty Deed 2 contains similar provisions as the Crosgrove Warranty Deed 1
regarding construction of bridges, flumes, and use of the property for "canal purposes
only." (R. 500, 528-30.)
Appellants Richins currently own property on the west side and Appellant Stern
currently owns property on the east side of Reach 17. (R. 23, 26-7, 187, 206-08, 605-07.)
The Richins' and Stem's title originated with a deed from Charles and Elizabeth
Crosgrove, recorded in 1943. (R. 500, 521-23, 595-98.) The current deed to the Richins
describes the property as "to a point on the westerly line of the Utah Lake Irrigation
Company Canal.. . along said westerly line." (R. 504, 605-07.) The current deed to
Stem describes the property as "more or less to the East line of the Utah Lake Irrigation
10

Co. Canal. .. southeasterly along said canal." (R. 504, Exhibit 628-29.) Thus, the
property descriptions in the Stern and Richins deeds are consistent with the treatment of
Reach 17 as a separately owned parcel, and inconsistent with any overlapping ownership
interest in Richins and Stern in the Canal property. (R. 504.) Additionally, the current
tax assessor's map shows the Canal and the Richins and Stern properties as separate
parcels, and the assessor's records indicate that the Richins and Stern are not assessed
property taxes for any portion of the Canal. (R. 504, 672-73, 680-81.)
Reach 18:

ULIC obtained title to Reach 18 through a stipulated Judgment in

Condemnation against Susannah Crane, et al., (the "Crane Judgment") recorded August
22, 1914, decreeing that ULIC shall "take, acquire and have for its use in fee the land
hereinafter described" and finding the property was taken for a public use. (R. 532-33
(emphasis added).) The Crane Judgment was based upon a stipulation in which Crane
agreed that "a decree of condemnation may be entered herein, condemning in fee to
plaintiff the property hereinafter described for the purpose of constructing and
maintaining a canal over the same...." (R. 493-97 (emphasis added).) Under the Crane
Judgment, Crane received $700 for .56 acres, compared to the $350 Crosgrove received
for a fee interest in .51 acres in Reach 16, the $575 Crosgrove received for a fee interest
in .48 acres in Reach 17, and the $216 Smith received for an easement on .54 acres in
Reach 19. (R. 525-39.)
Appellant Berolatti currently owns property on the west side of Reach 18. (R. 28,
212-13.) Berolatti's title originates with a deed from Susannah Crane, et al., recorded in
1920. (R. 500, 521-23, 631-32.) Although the current deed to Berolatti, and an earlier
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deed to Loraine Sundquist, stated that the property runs "to the center of canal," these
deeds also contain the following exception in the property description: "less and
excepting therefrom any portion contained within the Draper Irrigation Right-of-Way."
(R. 212-13, 506, 642.) Additionally, the current tax assessor's map shows the Canal and
Berolatti's property as separate parcels, and the assessor's records indicate that Berolatti
is not assessed property tax for any portion of the Canal. (R. 507, 674.)
Reach 19:

ULIC obtained rights to Reach 19 through a 1915 Decree in

Condemnation against Elida Smith recorded July 21, 1915 (the "Smith Decree")
declaring that ULIC shall "take and acquire and have for its use for a right of way for its
canal and for the construction, operation and perpetual maintenance of said canal all
matters pertaining thereto for its successful operation into and over the following
described tract of land..." (R. 535-39.) The Smith Decree further states that the canal
property was taken for a public use. (R. 535-39.)
Appellant Cummings currently owns property on the west side of Reach 19. (R.
32, 224.) The District agrees with the Landowners that Cummings holds title to the
center of the Canal, subject to the easement that was created by the Smith Decree.
Disputed Facts
The District disputes certain statements set forth in the Landowners' Statement of
Facts of their Opening Brief. First, the District disputes the Landowners' statement that
Utah Lake Irrigation only had authority to condemn for a right-of-way. (Appellants'
Opening Br. 4). This statement, which is only supported by reference to statute,
constitutes a legal conclusion and is otherwise lacking any factual support from the
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record. In any event, as the District argued in its Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment, this statutory limitation on an entity's condemnation
powers could only possibly apply in cases involving a contested condemnation decree.
(R. 1404). The rule does not apply in cases where the property owner unambiguously
agreed to a fee simple condemnation and was compensated accordingly, as is the case
here in regards to Reach 18. (R. 1404).
Additionally, the Landowners' statements that Draper Irrigation terminated its use
of the Canal and stopped cleaning and maintaining the canal as early as 1993 have
previously been disputed by the District. (Appellants' Opening Br. 6-7 (disputed at R.
1400-01)). In fact, open irrigation flows in the Canal did not cease until 1995. (R. 339.)
Thereafter, Salt Lake County and later Draper City assumed responsibility over the Canal
for storm water purposes, and Draper Irrigation continued to use the Canal for existing or
future pipelines, including its pressurized irrigation pipeline. (R. 339-40).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The district court correctly granted the District's motion for summary judgment
based upon the law and undisputed facts, and the Court should affirm that decision.
Although the Landowners dispute that fee simple title was conveyed to the District's
predecessors for Reaches 16-18, all parties agree that the District has at least an easement
over all of the subject Reaches and properties. Because the construction of the Aqueduct
is within the scope of a canal easement, the Court can affirm the district court's decision
for that simple reason. The Court should affirm the decision for the following additional
reasons:
13

First, the district court correctly concluded that historic statutory warranty deeds
conveyed fee simple title to Reaches 16 and 17. Warranty deeds which purport to
"convey and warrant" property are presumed to effect a conveyance in fee simple
absolute, unless accompanied by a qualifying clause in the granting language. The words
"for canal purposes only," which appear at the end of these deeds, are not part of the
granting language. Based on a plain reading of the deed and the position of this
language, this clause can only be construed as a personal covenant, which does not bind
successive owners of the property. Although unnecessary, if the Court looks at extrinsic
evidence, the subsequent deeds to the properties adjacent to the Canal, as well as current
tax assessor's records, confirm that the adjacent properties are separate parcels that do not
include the Canal property. Finally, the language of the deeds do not create restrictive
covenants enforceable by or against the present parties because the Landowners did not
provide sufficient evidence to show the original parties had the necessary intent that the
covenants should run with the land.
Second, the district court correctly concluded that the stipulated condemnation
judgment regarding Reach 18 granted title in fee simple, and not as an easement. The
judgment clearly states that the grantee shall "take," "acquire," and "have for its use," "in
fee." Although statutes in force at the time of this condemnation may have limited the
condemnation to the taking of a mere easement, the undisputed facts support the
conclusion that this was not a typical condemnation, but rather the grantees stipulated to
a condemnation in fee, and were compensated accordingly.
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Third, the district court correctly concluded that the installation of an underground
water pipeline was within the scope of the Reach 19 easement. Although the interest in
Reach 19 was limited to an easement for a "canal," the District's construction of the
buried Aqueduct, which runs through the Canal property, does not impose any additional
burden; rather, it actually decreased the burden on the land. Moreover, a canal easement
does not limit the easement-holder's use to irrigation water, nor does it limit use to an
open ditch as opposed to a buried pipeline. Instead, courts have routinely held that the
installation of buried pipes into a previously open canal is a reasonable use within the
scope of a canal easement.
Finally, the district court correctly concluded that Draper Irrigation, the District's
predecessor in interest, did not abandon its easement interest in the Canal. As the
Landowners admit, mere evidence of non-use does not constitute abandonment. Rather,
a claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the owner intended to
abandon the easement. Moreover, rights-of-way dedicated to a public use require an
even stricter approach in applying the general doctrine of abandonment. The undisputed
facts support the conclusion that Draper Irrigation, through its actions and recorded
notices, intended to retain - not abandon - its rights to the Canal as a water conveyance
facility, whether for irrigation, culinary water, storm water, or other utility purposes. The
Landowners' argument that the change in use from irrigation to storm water drainage
does not meet the clear and convincing standard, especially considering the Canal was
dedicated to a public use.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN INTERPRETING THE
CONVEYANCE DOCUMENTS FOR REACHES 16 TO 18 AS GRANTING
FEE SIMPLE TITLE WITH PERSONAL COVENANTS AND NOT AS
TRANSFERS OF EASEMENTS OR OTHER LIMITED INTERESTS.
On summary judgment, the district court held that the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds

were "standard warranty deeds that 'conveyed and warranted'" Reaches 16 and 17 to
ULIC, the District's predecessor in interest, in fee simple. (R. 1865.) In doing so, the
court correctly applied the common law presumption that title is granted in fee simple
when the deed uses the "convey and warrant" language, unless there is a qualifying
clause in the granting language. (R. 1865-66), see Haynes v. Hunt, 85 P.2d 861, 864
(Utah 1939). The court determined that the Landowners did not overcome this
presumption of fee simple title, concluding that the words "for canal purposes only," as
well as the language providing for construction of bridges and flumes must be construed
as personal covenants which do not bind successive owners. (R. 1865-66.) The district
court further confirmed that the Crane Judgment, by stipulation, validly conveyed Reach
18 to ULIC in fee simple. (R. 1865.)
The district court did not err in concluding that the District's predecessor in
interest, ULIC, obtained fee simple title to Reaches 16, 17 and 18, or that the limitations
expressed in the conveyances are simply personal covenants and not limitations on
interest.
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A. The District's Predecessors Obtained Fee Simple Title Without Restrictive
Covenants to Reaches 16 and 17.
1.

The Crosgrove Warranty Deeds Conveyed Fee Simple Title.

The Crosgrove Warranty Deeds were standard warranty deeds, regular in form,
that expressly "conveyed and warranted" Reaches 16 and 17 to ULIC. (R. 948-49, 95860.) The only possible interpretation of these deeds is that they conveyed to ULIC fee
simple title to Reaches 16 and 17. This fee simple interest subsequently passed to Draper
City, who had the full and exclusive right to grant an easement to the District and to
define the scope of that easement.
The object of deed construction is to ascertain the intent of the parties. See Panos
v. Olsen and Assoc. Const, Inc, 2005 UT App 446, f 15, n. 3, 123 P.3d 816; Khalsa v.
Ward, 2004 UT App 393, f 7, 191 P.3d 843. When the deed is unambiguous, the intent
of the parties must be determined from the language of the deed alone. Panos, 2005 UT
App 446 at f 15, n.3; Khalsa, 2004 UT App 393 at % 7. In construing a deed, courts
should regard the deed in its entirety, considering the parts of the deed together so that no
part is rejected. See Tretheway v. Furstenau, 2001 UT App 400, % 9, P.3d 649 (holding
that the court must attempt to construe the contract so as to harmonize and give effect to
all of its provisions). In addition, the court must "resolve all doubts in favor of the free
and unrestricted use of property." Panos, 2005 UT App 446 at <[| 18. Furthermore, the
court considers the instrument relative to the statutes in effect at the time of the
conveyance. Clark v. CSX Transp., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 752, 758-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
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Under Utah law in 1914, at the time when the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds were
executed, a deed in the form of a warranty deed that "conveys and warrants" property
"shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee." 2 Compiled Laws of
the State of Utah § 4881 (1917). (R. 988-89.)1 Statutes at the time also provided that
"[a] fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance of real estate,
unless it appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate was intended." 2 Compiled
Laws of the State of Utah § 4871 (1917). (R. 987.)2 Common law has also long held that
use of the language "convey and warrant" normally implies a grant of a fee, unless
accompanied by a qualifying clause in the granting language, see Haynes v. Hunt, 85
P.2d 861, 864 (Utah 1939), and that "a deed regular in form is presumed to convey the
entire fee simple." Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976); see also
Glauser Storage, LLC. v. Smedley, 27 P.3d 565, 569 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). Finally, "in
order to overcome that presumption, one who attacks a deed has the burden of proving
otherwise by clear and convincing evidence." Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156.
Measured against these standards, there can be no doubt that the Crosgrove
Warranty Deeds conveyed fee simple title to ULIC. The language appearing in the
covenants at the end of the deeds - "Said strip of land to be used for canal purposes only"
- can only be construed as a covenant between grantor and grantee not affecting the
conveyance of fee title. Deeds follow an orderly pattern with identifiable elements:
(1) premises; (2) habendum and tenendum; (3) reddendum; (4) conditions; (5) clause of
1

This statute remains in effect today. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (2010).

2

See also Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-3 (2010).
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warranty; (6) covenants; and (7) a conclusion. 9 Thompson on Real Property, Second
Thomas Edition § 82.07 (David A. Thomas ed. 1999).3 The premises clause identifies the
parties, recitals, if any, and the consideration, and includes the granting language, which
identifies the granted property. Id.; Bryant v. Shields, 18 S.E.2d 157, 159-60 (N.C.
1942). Habendum and tenendum clauses work to "curtail, limit, or qualify the estate
conveyed in the granting clause," and are often introduced by the language "to have and
to hold." Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, 987 P.2d 30, 33 (Utah
1999); 9 Thompson on Real Property § 82.07. A reddendum clause reserves some
interest in the grantor. Conditions clauses establish contingencies upon which the estate
granted may be defeated. Finally, a covenant clause is merely an agreement between the
parties for certain performances. Id.
As noted above, the premises clause of the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds include the
statement that the Crosgroves "hereby convey and warrant" Reaches 16 and 17 to ULIC.
(R. 948-49, 958-60.) The common law rule set forth in Haynes, which is relied upon by
the Landowners, merely states that fee simple title is not granted if the "convey and
warrant" language is accompanied by a qualifying clause in the granting language.
Haynes, 85 P.2d at 864. There is no qualifying clause which limits the scope of the
conveyance in the granting language of the premises clause of the Crosgrove Warranty
Deeds. Furthermore, nothing in the remaining language in the deeds contradicts the

Deeds often do not contain conditions, covenants, or habendum, tenendum, and
reddendum clauses, which generally are not used in modern deeds as those elements are
unnecessary for a valid deed. 9 Thompson on Real Property, Second Thomas Edition §
82.07 (David A. Thomas ed. 1999); see Flynn v. Palmer, 70 N.W.2d 231 (Wis. 1955).
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presumption that the parties intended to convey a fee simple title. There are no
habendum, tenendum, or reddendum clauses, which are used as limiting tools.
The language in the deed which provides for the construction of bridges and
flumes and for the use of the property for canal purposes does not appear until the very
end of the deeds, and is notably not part of the granting language found in the premises
clause. This language does not create any reservations and does not identify any
contingencies that would defeat the estate. Based on its content and placement, this
language can only be construed as a covenant clause—an agreement between the parties
for certain performances—which does not affect the title conveyed under the deeds.
The Landowners cite several cases as supposedly affirming their argument that the
language "for canal purposes only" must be interpreted as limiting title to Reaches 16 and
17, (Appellants' Opening Br. 14-15), but in fact, none of these cases support such a
proposition. First, Brown v. Penn Cent. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1987), is
distinguishable for several reasons. Although the deed in that case had language stating
that the conveyance was "for Depot and Rail Road Purposes," this clause, unlike the "for
canal purposes only" covenant clause in the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds, was found in the
granting language of the premises clause, which, as discussed above, is a proper way to
limit fee simple title. Brown, 510 N.E.2d at 644. Furthermore, the deed in that case also
contained a habendum clause which explicitly stated that the grantees were "to Have and
to Hold . . . so long as the same shall be required for the use and purposes of said Road."
Id. That deed was very explicit in granting only a right-of-way, and the mere fact that it
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had one clause that sounds similar to a clause in the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds does not
make that court's holding applicable in this case.
Similarly, in Gold Mountain Development, L.L.C. v. Missouri Flat, LTD, 2005 UT
App 276 (unpublished), the court's holding was based on more than just the limiting
language. There the court construed the granting document to be an easement, in part,
because the grantor reserved a right to enter and occupy the premises and because it had a
habendum clause which limited the grant to the "above described surface," which
description included the "grazing and agricultural purposes" limitation. 2005 UT App
276, at *l-2. This is not comparable to the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds, which do not
contain any reservations or a title-limiting habendum clause. Also, although the decision
is unclear, it appears that the "grazing and agricultural purposes" limitation may have
been part of the granting language, and thus unlike the separate and distinct covenant
clause in the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds.
The Landowners' citation to Sanborn v. City ofMinneapolis, 29 N.W. 126 (Minn.
1886) is also extremely tenuous. Although the case once mentions the fact that the deed
included the language "deeded for alley purposes," the holding does not even discuss this
clause. 29 N.W. at 126-27. Rather, the court bases its holding on the fact that the alley
grant mentions the rights of others who own property along that alley, and it is uncertain
what role, if any, the "for alley purposes" language played in the court's decision.
Finally, two of the cases which the Landowners cite, Harvest Queen Mill &
Elevator Co. v. Sanders, 370 P.2d 419 (Kan. 1962), and Preseault v. United States, 100
F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996), are both completely inapplicable because their holdings are
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based on interpretations of the deeds under Kansas and Vermont state laws that only
pertain to deeds which granted railroad rights-of-ways. See Harvest Queen, 370 P.2d at
423 ("We have held that when land is devoted to railroad purposes it is immaterial
whether the railway company acquired it by virtue of an easement, by condemnation,
right-of-way deed, or other conveyance

This court has uniformly held that railroads

do not own fee titles to narrow strips taken as right-of-way."); Preseault, 100 F.3d at
1535 ("[T]he actions of the Railroad in this case fall under well-established Vermont
laws and procedures for acquisition of rights-of-way by companies incorporated for
railroad purposes . . . The taking, pursuant to statutory authority, gave the railroad only an
easement, not a fee." (Citations omitted)). Thus, it is immaterial whether the language in
those deeds compares to the deeds in this case, since those deeds were specially
interpreted under statutory railroad laws.
Because there is no ambiguity in the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds, the court should
look only to the language of those instruments in construing their effect. However, if the
court were to look to extrinsic evidence, it would find that such evidence overwhelmingly
supports the interpretation that the deeds granted fee simple title to ULIC. As discussed
in the Statement of Facts above, subsequent deeds to property adjoining the Canal,
including the Landowners' current deeds, either do not include the Canal property or
expressly except the Canal from the property description.
For example, Appellant Stern's current deed, which deals with property adjacent
to Reach 17, states that his property runs "to the East line of the Utah Lake Irrigation Co.
Canal; thence southeasterly along said canal." (R. 187.) The current Richins and
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Costanza deeds, which deal with property adjacent to Reaches 17 and 16 respectively,
contain similar descriptions. (R. 206-08, 202-03.) The Landowners' properties simply
do not overlap the Canal, as illustrated by the current tax assessor's map, and the
Landowners have not been assessed property taxes on any portion of the Canal property.
These undisputed facts establish two crucial points. First, because the
Landowners do not own any property in the Canal, they have no rights to challenge the
District's title to or use of the Canal. Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corp., Inc., 659
P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Utah 1983) ("To succeed in an action to quiet title to real estate, a
plaintiff must prevail on the strength of his own claim to title and not on the weakness of
a defendant's title or even its total lack of title.") Second, the fact that none of the
existing adjoining properties overlaps Reaches 16 and 17 of the Canal supports the
interpretation that the original deeds to the Canal created a fee simple interest in a
separate tract of land, and not a mere easement over property retained by the original
grantors.
Therefore, the district court did not, as the Landowners argue, fail to give effect to
the "for canal purposes only" language. The district court correctly concluded that
"given the placement of this language, it must be construed as a covenant between
grantor and grantee, which would not otherwise limit the title," and the decision should
be upheld. (R. 1866.)
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2.

The Crosgrove Warranty Deeds Did Not Contain Restrictive
Covenants Running with the Land.

Although the language "for canal purposes only" in the Crosgrove Warranty
Deeds may have created personal covenants between the Crosgroves and ULIC, the
Landowners' argument that these constitute restrictive covenants running with the land
fails as a matter of law. To establish that a restrictive covenant exists, the Landowners
must establish three elements: (1) the covenant must touch and concern the land; (2) the
original covenanting parties must intend the covenant to run with the land; and (3) there
must be privity of estate. View Condo. Owners Ass 'n v. MSICO, 2004 UT App. 104, ^
17, 90 P.3d 1042 (overruled on other grounds). A covenant that fails to meet all three
requirements is a personal covenant that does not does not bind or benefit successive land
owners. Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 623 (Utah
1989).
A party wishing to prove that a restrictive covenant runs with the land must
provide "clear and convincing" evidence of the original parties' intent that the covenant
run with the land. Smith v. Estate ofLaTray, 161 A.D.2d 1178, 1179 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990) (requiring that "[a] person seeking to establish that a covenant runs with the land
must show that such was the intent of the grantor and grantee"); see also Flying
Diamond, 116 P.2d at 627. Evidence of intent may be express or implied. Id. Phrases
like "this covenant is intended to be a running covenant, burdening and benefiting the
parties' successors and assigns" are typically employed to demonstrate a party's intent
that the covenant is to run with the land. James H. Backman & David A. Thomas, A
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Practical Guide to Disputes Between Adjoining Landowners: Easements § 12.04(b)
(2004). Mentioning that the covenant runs to "heirs" "assigns" or "successors"
establishes also a modicum of intent. Id. When an agreement lacks such language, it is a
"major factor" in leading a court to determine that the parties did not intend the
agreement to run with the land. 43 N.Y. Jur. 2d Deeds § 64 (2005). Finally, the court
must "resolve all doubts in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property." Panos,
2005 UTApp 4464 18.
Here, the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds do not contain any language evidencing that
ULIC and the Crosgroves intended that the language "for canal purposes only" run with
the land. The deeds do not mention heirs or assigns, even though such language was
commonly used at the time. See Backman & Thomas, supra, at § 12.04. The tone of the
deed also suggests the parties intended to limit obligations to only the original grantor
and grantee. Immediately above the language in question, the parties specify that ULIC
was to construct a bridge andflumesacross the canal "for the use of the grantor." (R.
948-49, 958-60.) This language does not extend the benefit to any successive owners;
rather, it limits the benefit to the Crosgrove grantors.
In addition, the provisions for the bridges andflumeswere not restricting
covenants, but were merely expressions of negotiations for requirements in exchange for
the deeds. These provisions are immediately followed by the "canal purposes only"
language, as if part of the same discussion on contract negotiations. Not only did the
parties fail to use express language binding "heirs and assigns," but the language and
circumstances suggest that the parties only considered immediate obligations between
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themselves and did not intend for the stated covenants to run with the land. Therefore,
the covenants terminated when the Crosgroves subsequently conveyed their property, and
the language "for canal purposes only" does not bind Draper or the District.
The Landowners, on the other hand, argue that the covenants must be restrictive
because there is "no indication that Utah Lake Irrigation's covenants were personal
between Utah Lake and the Crosgroves." (Appellants' Opening Br. 20.) However, this
argument fails to recognize that it is their burden to provide clear and convincing
evidence of the parties' intent for the covenant to run with the land, not the other way
around. The Landowners cannot provide such clear and convincing proof that the parties
intended the covenant to run with the land, and the lack of evidence actually tends to
show that the covenant was not, in fact, intended to be permanently restrictive upon all
successive owners.
Finally, a restrictive covenant is invalid and unenforceable if it is illegal,
unconstitutional or violates public policy as an unreasonable restraint on use.
Restatement (Third) Property § 3.1 (2000); Davidson Bros v. D. Katz & Sons, 579 A.2d
288 (N J. 1990) (voiding covenant prohibiting use of property as supermarket for forty
years on public policy grounds because supermarket business was needed in inner city
locale). Here, a restriction that would preclude the installation of a pipeline that is
necessary to provide water to the residents of the Salt Lake valley and that will reduce the
negative impacts of the Canal would similarly violate public policy and should be
invalidated.
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Therefore, the district court did not err when it concluded that the Crosgrove
Warranty Deeds created personal, and not restrictive, covenants, and the decision should
be upheld. (R. 1865-66.)
B. The District's Predecessors Obtained Fee Simple Title to Reach 18.
The District's title to Reach 18 derives from the Crane Judgment, a stipulated
condemnation judgment in favor of ULIC. The Crane Judgment decreed that ULIC
"take, acquire and have for its use in fee" the Canal property (emphasis added). (R. 97073.)
The district court did not err when it interpreted the Crane Judgment as granting
fee simple title in Reach 18 to ULIC. (R. 1865.) This is the only reasonable
interpretation of the Crane Judgment. The term "in fee" clearly modifies each of the
preceding terms: "take," "acquire" and "have for its use." Thus, ULIC shall take in fee,
acquire in fee, and have the property for its use in fee. The Crane Judgment does not use
the terms "easement" or "right of way," nor does it limit ULICs interest or its use of the
property. It merely contains certain personal covenants requiring ULIC to construct
flumes and maintain a bridge over the canal, prohibiting the deposit of excavation
material on the banks of the canal, and allowing Crane to install gates and water stock
from the canal. Finally, any doubt about the effect of the Crane Judgment is removed by
the Crane Stipulation, which expressly authorizes a decree "condemning in fee" the
property to ULIC.
The statutes in force at the time of the Crane Judgment appear to have allowed
only the taking of an easement for this type of condemnation. See 2 Compiled Laws of
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the State of Utah § 7331 (1917); (R. 991-92.) Consequently, the Landowners argue that
the Crane Judgment must be interpreted as an easement under Moon Waters Users Assoc.
v. Hanson, 535 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1975). That case held that fee simple language in an
ambiguous condemnation decree should be disregarded, and the decree should be
construed as an easement where the condemnor's powers were limited to the taking of an
easement.
The Landowners' argument might have merit if the present case involved a
contested decree entered over the property owner's objection, as was the case in Moon
Lake. However, the Crane Judgment was entered pursuant to an unambiguous stipulation
in which the property owner agreed that "a decree of condemnation may be entered
herein, condemning in fee to plaintiff the property hereafter described." (Emphasis added)
(R. 975.) In other words, this is a case where the property owner agreed to a fee simple
condemnation and was compensated accordingly. Moon Lake and the statutory
limitations on ULIC's condemnation powers do not compel the conclusion that the Crane
Judgment granted only an easement.
Finally, as is the case with the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds in Reaches 16 and 17,
extrinsic evidence supports the interpretation that the Crane Judgment grants fee simple
title in Reach 18 to ULIC. (R. 908-09.) The current Berolatti deed, which deals with
property adjacent to Reach 18, expressly excepts "any portion contained within the
Draper Irrigation Right-of-Way." (R. 977.) The current tax assessor's map shows Reach
18 of the Canal as a separate parcel designated as "Draper Irrigation Canal," similar to
Reaches 16 and 17 and in contrast to Reach 19. (R. 955-56.) Appellant Berolatti is not
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paying taxes on the Canal property. The historical evidence indicates that Crane was
compensated for the fee simple value of the property taken. In sum, all the relevant
evidence supports the conclusion that fee simple title passed under the Crane Judgment,
and that Draper was fully vested with that fee interest when it granted the District
Easement.
Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that fee simple title to Reach 18
was granted to ULIC, and the decision should be upheld. (R. 1865.)
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
DISTRICT'S USE OF REACH 19 OF THE CANAL DID NOT EXCEED
THE SCOPE OF THE EASEMENT.
Unlike the situations in Reaches 16 through 18, the District conceded for purposes

of the underlying summary judgment motion that its rights in Reach 19 are based upon an
easement held by its predecessors. ULIC condemned the right of way for Reach 19 under
the Smith Decree, which grants "a right of way for [a] canal and for the construction,
function and perpetual maintenance of said canal and all matters pertaining thereto for its
successful operation, into and over the . . . land." (R. 979-83.) On summary judgment,
the district court determined that the District's use of Reach 19 does not exceed the scope
of the easement. (R. 1866.) The court concluded that "there is not legal or factual
support for the plaintiffs5 position that the easement with respect to Reach 19 must be
limited to irrigation purposes only." (R. 1866.) Furthermore, the court held that the
creation of the Aqueduct in the Canal is reasonable, and does not pose an excessive
burden. (R. 1866.) As discussed in more detail below, this Court should uphold the
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district court's determination that the District's use did not exceed the scope of the
existing easement rights in Reach 19.4'5
A. The District's Use Falls Within the Plain Meaning of the Easement Granted
Under The Smith Decree.
The interpretation of easements follows the same rules of construction as used
with contracts. Canyon Meadows Home Owners Ass 'n v. Wasatch County, 2001 UT
App. 414 <f 7, 40 P.3d 1148.6 When determining the scope of an easement, the court must
first look to the plain language of the instrument creating the easement. See id.; Jon W.
Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land §8:2 (2000).
When the language is precise, then such terminology governs. Gilmore v. Macey, 2005
UTApp.351,p4,121P.3d57.
When the language or a term in the easement is ambiguous, courts generally
construe the agreement in favor of the grantee. See Griffeth v. Utah Power & Light, 226
F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 1955); Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762,
766 (3d Cir. 1994); 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34.12 (Michael Allan
4

Under well settled legal principles relating to utility easements, Draper City had the
ability to grant to the District the right to make use of the Reach 19 easement, provided
the District's uses are within the scope of the original easement. See authorities cited in
the District's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction (R. 46569). The Landowners have not claimed otherwise.
5

If the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds or the Crane Judgment were construed to convey only
easements over Reaches 16 through 18, the analysis regarding the scope of those
easements and the District's use would be the same as it is for Reach 19. The term
"canal" is broad enough to encompass the District's use of the Canal for the Aqueduct.
6

Easements created by eminent domain decree should be construed in the same manner
as other express easements. 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34.12
(Michael Allan Wolfed., 2000); see also Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of
Easements and Licenses in Land, §8.3 n. 1 (2001).
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Wolfed., 2000). Applying this rule, courts often construe ambiguous phrases broadly.
For example, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire interpreted "a right to the water of
said bay" to mean a right to use the water for "fishing, swimming, skating, and other
water-connected activities." Epstein, 13 F.3d at 766 (citing Bisson v. Laconia Inv.
Properties, 559 A.2d 1338, 1340-1341 (N.H. 1989)). A Florida court interpreted the
phrase "utility line" to include the installation of a sewer line. Kimlow, Inc. v. Seminole
Landing Ass'n, 586 So. 2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Easement language should be construed in light of the conditions in place at the
time the easement was created. See Griffeth, 226 F.2d at 667; 4 Powell, § 34.12.
Moreover, when an easement is obtained for consideration, as is the case here, more
emphasis should be given to the grantee's reasonable expectations. See, e.g., Kertz v.
AssociatedElec. Co-op., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Mo. App. 1986) ("A grantee who
has paid for a conveyance is entitled to have his reasonable expectations taken into
account in determining the meaning of the conveyance"); Griffeth, 226 F.2d at 667 ("The
easement must be construed against successors of the grantor, since it was not gratuitous,
but one for which consideration was given and compensation paid.")
In keeping with the rules of construction, in this case, the term "canal" is properly
construed to include underground pipes that transport water because that is the commonly
held, unambiguous definition of the term. The definition of "canal" and the use of the
word at the time the easement was conveyed included underground pipes that transport
water. Canal is a noun derived from the French word canalis, which means pipe.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 324 (3d ed. 1971); Appendix 13. It is
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formally defined as a channel or watercourse. Id. The definition applicable in this case is
watercourse, which means "a made channel (as a ditch, canal, or aqueduct) for carrying
water to or away from a particular place." Id. at 2582 (emphasis added).
At the time of the Smith Decree (1915), the term canal commonly included
underground pipes that convey water. This is demonstrated in a 1915 case in which the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals surveyed Utah's laws, customs, and court
decisions to determine the meaning of the phrase "canals, ditches, and reservoirs" used a
statute granting rights of way across federal land. Utah Light & Traction Company v.
United States, 230 F. 343, 345 (8th Cir. 1915). The court concluded that such terms were
"broad enough to include dams, flumes, pipes, and tunnels as analogous or incidental to,
and discharging the functions of, such reservoirs, ditches and canals." Id. (emphasis
added); see also Peck v. Howard, 167 P.2d 753, 761 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946) (defining canal
to include dam, flume, pipe and tunnel). Because the definition of canal and the common
usage of the word encompass an underground pipeline, this Court should uphold the
district court's determination that the District's Aqueduct is well within the scope of the
plain meaning of the Smith Decree.
The plain language of the Smith Decree speaks for itself, but even if this Court
were to look at extrinsic evidence, the facts indicate that a broad interpretation of the term
"canal" is consistent with what were likely the parties' reasonable expectations. As noted
in the Statement of Facts, above, ULIC paid a substantial sum for the Reach 19 easement.
Even though the statute in force at the time of this condemnation may have limited
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ULIC's condemnation powers to the taking of an easement, it is nonetheless clear from
the record that Smith was compensated for the full value of the fee simple estate. At a
minimum, therefore, the Smith Decree must be construed as an all-encompassing
easement. Under the circumstances, it should be clear that the Decree includes the right
to lay underground water pipelines on the property.
The Landowners argue that the District's use of Reach 19 exceeds the scope of the
Smith Decree, based on the faulty premise that the word "canal" is somehow limited to
mean only an irrigation canal. (Appellants' Opening Br. 24-36.) As explained above,
however, the true meaning of canal is much broader. Furthermore, the Smith Decree
contains no language referring to the Canal as an irrigation canal. It does not use the
word "open" or "ditch." The word "irrigation" appears only in reference to ULIC's
name. The same applies to the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds and the Crane Judgment.
There is simply no basis for the Landowners' contention that use of the Canal is
expressly limited to an open irrigation ditch.
Ultimately, the Landowners argue that the district court erred by "ignoring" the
primary question of whether the District's supposed "change in use" from open irrigation
to piped culinary water exceeded the scope of the Smith Decree, and that the court
focused only on the question of the reasonableness or additional burden of the changed
use. (Appellants' Opening Br. 26.) This is not true, and should not be the basis for a
reversal of the district court's decision. The district court, in fact, directly addressed the
change in use question when it stated that "there is no legal or factual support for the
7

2 Compiled Laws of the State of Utah § 7331 (1917).
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plaintiffs' position that the easement with respect to Reach 19 must be limited to
irrigation purposes only." (R. 1866.) Thus, the court implicitly held that the District's
so-called change in use did not exceed the scope of the easement.
B. Case Law Establishes that Installing Underground Pipes Is not Unduly
Burdensome and Does Not Represent an Expansion of Use Under a Canal
Easement.
Asidefromthe plain language and reasonable interpretation of the easement
document, another factor that courts look at in determining whether a use exceeds the
scope of an easement is whether the use creates a greater burden on the servient estate.
See Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co, v. Moyle, 159 P.2d 596, 597 (Utah 1945) ("Moyle
7") ("[N]o material change or enlargement of the right acquired can be made if thereby a
greater burden is placed on the servient estate."). Case law has firmly established that it
is not unduly burdensome, and thus it is within the scope of the easement, for a holder of
a canal easement to install an underground pipeline in the existing canal to transport
water more efficiently, even if the installation involves the removal of existing trees and
flora. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998); Abbott v, Nampa Sch.
Dist No. 131, 808 P.2d 1289, 1294-1295 (Idaho 1991).
In Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, the trial court granted a farmer's claim that he had a
prescriptive easement in a neighboring landowner's canal, and the landowner appealed.
961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998). This Court affirmed the trial court and held that the pipe
the farmer had installed in the canal to convey water was included in the farmer's
easement rights. Id. at 313. This Court held that easement owners are permitted to install
"reasonable and necessary improved structures (not taking more or different land)," as
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long as doing so does not change or add additional burdens to the servient estate. Id. at
313 (quoting Harvey v. Haights Bench Irrigation Co., 318 P.2d 343 (Utah 1957)).
Applying this rule, this court held that a canal easement owner could install a pipe in
order to more efficiently transport and conserve water because an easement for a canal
includes "the right to improve the method of carrying the irrigation water." Id. (citing
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 157 (Utah 1946)).
Analyzing a similar set of facts as those in this case, in Abbott, a school district
entered into a license agreement with an irrigation district to place an irrigation ditch in
an underground pipe to improve the appearance and value of the school property and to
remove the open ditch as a possible safety hazard to school children. 808 P.2d 1289,
1291 (Idaho 1991). The property owners opposed the modification to the ditch and filed
for a preliminary injunction. Id. The court denied the injunction and entered a final order
in favor of the school district, and the property owners appealed. Id. The Idaho Supreme
Court affirmed the district court and held that the school district's license and
modifications were within the easement. Id. at 1294-95. The Court held that
[A]n easement granted or reserved in general terms, without any
limitations as to its use, is one of unlimited reasonable use. It is not
restricted to use merely for such purposes of the dominant estate as
are reasonably required at the time of the grant or reservation, but
the right may be exercised by the dominant owner for those purposes
to which that estate may be subsequently devoted. Thus, there may
be an increase in the volume and kind of use of such an easement
during the course of its enjoyment.
Id. at 1293 (citing 25 am.jur.2d easements and licenses § 74, pp. 479-80 (1966)
(emphasis added). As stated by the court, "the rule is that, absent language in the
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easement to the contrary, the uses made by the servient and dominant owners may be
adjusted consistent with the normal development of their respective lands." Id. at 129394. The court found that 'the placement of an irrigation ditch in an underground pipe was
not an unusual occurrence," and therefore, modifications toward that end were not
outside the scope of a canal owner's easement. Id. at 1294-95.
In another Utah case, this Court found that the plaintiff irrigation company could
waterproof the canals and ditches that extended across the defendants' land. Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 11A P.2d 148, 161 (Utah 1946) ("MoylelF).
Even though waterproofing would result in depriving the flora and fauna existing on the
canal banks of water, this court found that the improvements to the canal were within the
scope of the easement. Id. This Court found that the trees and the seepage water that fed
them were merely an incidental benefit of the dominant owner's easement and that the
easement owners were not liable for "additional burdens which may result from the
easement owner exercising his right to make changes in his method of using the easement
which was included in the easement as originally acquired." Id. at 158. Having decided
that plaintiffs easement included the right to improve the ditches in the interest of water
conservation, this court held that so long as plaintiff carried out its rights to improve in a
reasonable manner, defendants had no legal grounds for complaint though the
improvements would potentially result in decreasing the value of the servient estates. Id.
at 160.
In each of the above cited cases, the principal consideration in determining
whether changes to an existing canal were within the scope of the easement was the
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extent of the burden that any such change would have on the servient estates. See
Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 313; Abbott, 808P.2dat 1294-1295; Moyle, 174P.3dat 161.
Because the modifications did not place any substantial additional burdens on the servient
estates, the courts found that the changes were reasonable and thereby within the scope of
the easement. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 313; Abbott, 808 P.2d at 1294-1295; Moyle, 174
P.3datl61.
In addition, the general rule is that utilization of improved technology achieved
since the inception of an easement does not exceed the scope or intent of the originally
granted easement. See, e.g., Cox v. Harden, 953 P.2d 294, 300 (N.M. Ct. App. 1.998)
(citing Restatement of Property (Servitudes) § 481 cmt. a to hold that "the passage of time
may later mandate the use of different, more modern methods to accomplish the same
purpose"); C/R T. V. v. Shannondale, Inc., 27 F.3d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging easement owner's right to use technological advancement). Parties to an
easement are deemed to have contemplated the easement holder's right to do whatever is
reasonably convenient or necessary in order to enjoy fully the purposes for which the
easement was granted. See Camp Meeker Water System, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com.,
799 P.2d 771 (Cal. 1990) (noting "the assumption that an express easement is intended to
accommodate future needs"); Bruce & Ely, supra, at § 8:3. Moreover, "reasonable use is
not fixed at a particular point, but may vary from time to time." Id. Hence, the holder of
an easement is "not limited to the type or degree of use that existed when the holder
acquired the easement. Absent specific provisions to the contrary, the concept of
reasonableness includes a consideration [of] technological developments." Id.
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Here, installing the Aqueduct is well within the easement rights created by the
Smith Decree. First, as in Abbott, the Smith Decree grants an easement in general terms,
thereby providing for unlimited reasonable use. The Smith Decree provides for "a right
of way for [a] canal and for the construction, function and perpetual maintenance of said
canal and all matters pertaining thereto for its successful operation, into and over the . . .
land." (R. 979-83.) The plain language of the Smith Decree suggests that the parties
intended for an easement that would adapt with changing needs and technology. The
parties created an easement that would allow the District's predecessor to enjoy fully the
purposes for which the easement was granted.
Second, as in Valcarce, Abbott and Moyle, the construction and maintenance of
the Aqueduct is clearly a reasonable use because it does not extend any additional
burdens on the property owners. To the contrary, the pipeline actually decreases the
burdens and provides additional benefits to the property owners. These benefits include
elimination of drowning hazards, foul odors associated with canal water, and mosquito
breeding areas, as well as easier crossings of the canal corridor, and the ability of
adjacent residents who have retained underlying fee ownership of the canal property to
regain limited use of the surface of the canal property. (R. 901.) The only drawback to
canal enclosure is the removal of trees that have grown up along the canal banks.
However, as in Moyle II, at most this represents the removal of an incidental benefit to
the canal, not the establishment of a permanent burden on the servient estate.
The Landowners have provided no pertinent evidence that the Canal will cause
additional burdens; instead, they merely rely on the bare assertion that the District is
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limited to an irrigation canal and that this is not an irrigation canal. (R. 1191-1212,121418, 1220-33.) The Landowners point to "large concrete blocks within Reaches 16
through 19, which function as air valve structures." (Appellants' Opening Br. 10.; photos
of the concrete air valves can be seen at R. 1206-10, 1212.) However, the Landowners
fail to argue how these air valves are any more burdensome than the Canal itself,
especially in light of the fact that the Landowners now have the added benefit of being
able to traverse and utilize most of the Canal property to an extent they never could
before.
Additionally, the Landowners exceed the scope of the issues on appeal when they
discuss, throughout their Opening Brief, the fact that the District built a walking trail
across the Canal easement on behalf of Draper City. {See, e.g., Appellant's Opening Br.
1, 2, 29, and 35.) As we have argued above, Draper City owns fee title to Reaches 16
through 18, and can thus construct a walking trail across the Canal property as it wishes.
As to Reach 19, the walking trail does not traverse Appellants Cummings' property, but
rather it traverses the property of Roger and Becky Chase, who are not parties to this
appeal. (Appellants' Opening Br. i.)
Finally, construction of the Aqueduct will allow utilization of improved
technology. While pipelines are not a new concept, the construction and employment of
the pipeline in this project will apply technologies that did not exist at the time the
easement was first created. The language of the Smith Decree supports the application of
ever evolving technology to the easement. Furthermore, the construction of the Aqueduct
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and enclosure of the Canal are consistent with the grant of the easement and are
reasonable.
The Landowners criticize the district court's dependence on the Moyle II and
Valcarce decisions on the basis that those cases involved a change in use (piping of
canals), but not a change in purpose (the pipes continued to carry irrigation water, as
before), thus distinguishing those cases from the case at hand, where the purpose changed
from carrying irrigation water to carrying culinary water. (Appellants' Opening Br. 3032.) However, this distinction is both immaterial and incorrect.
First, the fact that those cases did not involve changes from irrigation to another
type of water conveyance is not material to the holdings in those decisions. Furthermore,
the Landowners' contention is based on the faulty argument that the District's easement
is limited to irrigation purposes in the first place, despite the fact that there is no support
for such a limitation. As described above, the use of the Canal as an aqueduct is
completely within the scope of the plain language of the Smith Decree, and thus it is not a
change in use that deviates from the intended canal purposes.
For the foregoing reasons, installation of the underground pipeline is well within
the scope of the Smith Decree easement and the Court should uphold the district court's
decision to that effect.
C. Important Public Policy Considerations Favor The Broad Interpretation Of
Canal Easements.
Finally, this Court should consider the fact that public policy considerations
strongly favor granting the broad interpretation of canal easement to allow for the
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installation of an underground pipeline that will benefit the community while reducing
the burden of the Canal on surrounding residents. Several public policy considerations
lie at the heart of whether general canal easements, particularly ones that have existed for
many years, allow enclosure and conversion from irrigation to municipal uses. The
ability tofreelyconvert open canals to enclosed pipelines, to convert irrigation water to
municipal water, and to change the sources of the water carried in water conveyance
facilities has been crucial to Utah's historical development and remains crucial to the
future development of its water infrastructure. (R. 400.) When old canals such as the
Draper Canal were first established, they passed through large blocks of farmland held by
a handfiil of landowners. Acquiring or condemning the necessary property rights to
establish canals was simple and feasible. Today, these same canals pass through highly
urbanized corridors where the adjoining landowners number in the thousands.
Acquiring or condemning additional easement rights under these circumstances
would place an unreasonable burden on public utilities seeking to utilize the Canal
corridor. If a public water provider must condemn additional easement rights every time
it converts a canal to a pipe, changes sources of water, or switches from irrigation to
municipal use, water development in the region will be crippled. Preserving utility
corridors and allowing them to be freely utilized as the community grows and as
technology changes is vital to modern society. Because of this, courts in Utah and
around the country have tended to rule in favor of the broad interpretation of public
easement rights, and in favor of the free transferability and divisibility of such rights. See
discussion above. The Court here should again recognize these policy considerations and
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rely upon them as an additional reason to uphold the district court's decision to allow the
District to lay pipes in the Canal.
HI.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT DRAPER
IRRIGATION COMPANY DID NOT ABANDON ITS RIGHTS WHEN IT
STOPPED FLOWING IRRIGATION WATER IN THE CANAL.
On summary judgment, the district court held that the Landowners failed to offer

sufficient evidence that Draper Irrigation abandoned its interests in the Canal easement
along Reach 198 when it stopped flowing irrigation water in the canal, as the Canal has
"continuously been utilized for storm water drainage." (R. 1867.) Consistent with its
ruling that "canal" uses are not limited to irrigation, the court noted that it "is not
persuaded that using the easement with respect to Reach 19 in a manner other than for
irrigation flow constitutes abandonment." (R. 1867.) Because the Landowners cannot
provide clear and convincing evidence of Draper Irrigation's intent to abandon its
easement, as discussed in more detail below, this Court should uphold the district court's
determination that Draper Irrigation did not abandon its easement rights over Reach 19.9

As established above, the District's predecessors held a fee simple interest in Reaches
16, 17, and 18. Consequently, Landowners' abandonment claims apply only to Reach 19.
If the Crosgrove Warranty Deeds or the Crane Judgment were construed to convey only
easements, the analysis regarding abandonment for Reaches 16 through 18 would be the
same as it is for Reach 19.
9
The Landowners' claim of abandonment was originally dismissed at the hearing on
their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (R. 1389 (pg. 2 of hearing transcript).) At that
hearing, the Landowners' counsel conceded that "we don't have, Your Honor, in my
opinion we don't have the facts as anticipated or the law to prevail on those claims." (R.
1389 (pg. 2 of hearing transcript).) The Landowners later sought to resurrect those
claims, and the issue was briefed by the parties in relation to the District's Motion for
Summary Judgment. (R. 931-34, 1131-34, 1406-07.)
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Utah courts look at several different factors to determine whether an easement is
abandoned. These factors include: (1) whether the right was acquired by prescription or
grant; (2) the extent of its use; and (3) the actual intent of the owner. Western Gateway
Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977). If the easement was acquired
by grant or conveyance, then mere evidence of non-use does not constitute abandonment.
Id. at 182; see also Tuttle v. Sowardski, 126 P. 959, 965 (Utah 1912); Brown v. Oregon
Short Line R. Co., 102 P. 740, 742 (Utah 1909). Rather, the claimant must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the owner intended to abandon the easement and committed
acts in furtherance of such intent. Western Gateway Storage Co., 567 P.2d at 182.
This Court has previously addressed what type of evidence would constitute
abandonment of an irrigation ditch easement in the case of Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375
P.2d 762 (Utah 1962). There, this Court required clear and convincing evidence that the
owner of the easement "ceased to use the easement... with the intention to make no
further use of it." Id. at 766. Based on this standard, evidence that the owner filled dirt
around the head gate and left the ditch unused for several years in succession was
insufficient to establish abandonment. Id. at 766.
In another irrigation ditch abandonment case, this Court held evidence of "debris,
undergrowth and items of personal property" obstructing the right-of-way was
insufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard required to prove abandonment.
Western Gateway Storage Co., 567 P.2d at 182. Instead, this Court relied on evidence
that the right-of-way was used occasionally, was in a condition allowing for continued
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use, and accessible through a portion of removable fence, as a clear indication that the
right-of-way had not been abandoned. Id.
Moreover, rights-of-way dedicated to a public use require an even stricter
approach in applying the general doctrine of abandonment. Restatement (Third)
Property—Servitudes § 7.4 cmt f (2000). The Restatement notes, for example, with
respect to public roads and railroad rights of way that "the same considerations that
prevent the acquisition of rights against the public by adverse possession and prescription
suggest that neglect on the part of the public officials should not lead to loss of public
assets." Id.
This admonition was recently heeded in the case of Riverside Drainage Dist. of
Sedgwick County v. Hunt, 99 P.3d 1135 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). There, the court found a
drainage district's actions of not using a maintenance right-of-way for 28 years,
permitting the area to be fenced off and allowing underground utility lines and pavement
to be placed within the easement was insufficient evidence to establish abandonment. Id.
at 1140. The court held that "[a]n easement on land dedicated or condemned for a public
use does not revert to the fee owner unless its use for the dedicated or condemned
purposes has become impossible, or so highly improbable as to be practically impossible.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
In this case, the Landowners claim the portion of the Canal in question was
abandoned in 1993 when Draper Irrigation filed a Change Application with the State
Engineer by which Draper Irrigation abandoned a point of re-diversion at which it rediverted Jordan River waterfromthe East Jordan Canal into the [Draper] Canal.
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(Appellants' Opening Br. 37.) The Landowners further state that "Draper Irrigation
ceased to use the canal property, allowed the property to return to its natural state, and
wholly left the maintenance and cleanup of the canal property to the adjacent property
owners." (Appellants' Opening Br. 40.)
These arguments fall far short of establishing clear and convincing evidence that
Draper Irrigation "ceased to use the easement. . . with the intention to make no further
use of it." Use of Reaches 16 through 19 of the Canal never ceased and Draper Irrigation
never expressed intent to abandon any of its easement rights in that portion of the Canal.
(R. 902-904.) Irrigation flows may have ceased in 1995 (not 1993), but the Canal has
continuously served as a storm water drain from that time onward. Such use will
continue into the future through the storm drain line the District has constructed for
Draper City in the Canal alongside the Aqueduct. (R. 400.) Draper Irrigation continued
to maintain its interest in the Canal by recording a notice of interest in November 1998
and then transferring rights to Draper City in 2001 so that the Canal could be used for
storm drain and other utility purposes, including the District's Aqueduct. This recorded
notice of interest actually shows a clear and absolute intent not to abandon the easement.
Moreover, the Landowners are confusing the issues with their assertion that
Draper Irrigation's Change Application, pursuant to which Draper Irrigation "abandoned"
a diversion point, constitutes proof of abandonment of an easement interest. The
Landowners appear to be confusing abandonment of a diversion point, a concept unique
to issues of water law, with abandonment of the entire Canal. The filing of the change
application only indicates an intent to change the diversion point of a particular
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certificated water right (or group of water rights), according to statutory water law
requirements. While the 1993 Change Application may have abandoned a re-diversion
point, such that water was no longer diverted out of the Jordan River andflowedthrough
the Canal, nothing in the application even suggests abandonment of the Canal.
Furthermore, based upon the standard applied in Western Gateway Storage Co.,
the question of whether the Canal was "cleaned or maintained" is irrelevant. The
Landowners even admit that this evidence is insufficient to establish abandonment.
(Appellants' Opening Br. 41.) Instead, the fact that the Canal has remained in a condition
allowing for continued use (as demonstrated by the fact that it continues to convey storm
water), and has always remained accessible is clear indication that the right-of-way had
not been abandoned.
Finally, because the Canal is for a public use, a higher level of scrutiny should
apply in determining whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the District's
predecessor abandoned the Canal. In this case, the Landowners have failed to provide
any credible evidence that Draper Irrigation truly intended to abandon the canal, such as a
reconveyance of the easement property back to the Landowners. The only fact they can
rely upon is non-use, but as all the parties agree, mere non-use is insufficient evidence to
establish abandonment, especially in the context of public uses, which constitute vital
lifeblood to our communities. This Court must affirm that basic premise, and if it does
not, many important public uses such as water distribution lines, public roads, and utility
corridors could be at risk of being eliminated, thus depriving the public of essential
services in the future.
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Yet, even if this higher level of scrutiny does not apply, the Landowners still
cannot provide sufficient evidence to prove that the District's predecessors intended to
abandon the Canal. The continued use of the Canal for storm run-off and the filing of a
notice of interest more than sufficiently demonstrate that the District's predecessors did
not intend to abandon their interest in the Canal. Therefore, the District's predecessors
did not abandon their interest in the Canal and this Court should uphold the district
court's determination to that effect.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the District respectfully requests that the decisions of
the district court, regarding the issues on appeal in this case, be affirmed.
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